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Abstract
This special issue of Oñati Socio-Legal Series, titled Judging, Emotion and Emotion
Work, is the result of presentations and discussions during an interdisciplinary
workshop at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (IISL) held in May
2018. This issue builds on the growing critique of the dispassionate ideal of judicial
work, combining original theoretical insights with imaginative empirical analyses to
extend the understanding of emotion in judging. Fifteen articles are presented in four
themes: Theoretical, cultural and historical perspectives; Tensions of the
dispassionate ideal; Social dynamics of emotion in judging; and Research methods,
empirical insights and [changing] judicial practice. The international diversity of
contributions recognises similarities and differences in the structure and organization
of courts and the judiciary, and socio-cultural variations in emotional experience and
expression.
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Resumen
Este número de Oñati Socio-Legal Series, titulado Judging, Emotion and Emotion
Work, es el resultado de las exposiciones y debates de un seminario interdisciplinar
celebrado en el Instituto Internacional de Sociología Jurídica (IISJ) en mayo de 2018.
El número se basa en la creciente crítica del ideal desapasionado del trabajo judicial,
combinando perspectivas teóricas originales con análisis empíricos imaginativos, a
fin de ampliar la comprensión de la emoción en el trabajo judicial. Se presentan
quince artículos en cuatro temas: Perspectivas teóricas, culturales e históricas;
Tensiones del ideal desapasionado; Dinámicas sociales de la emoción en el trabajo
judicial; y Métodos de investigación, perspectivas empíricas y trabajo judicial
[cambiante]. El carácter diverso e internacional de los artículos reconoce similitudes
y diferencias en la estructura y organización de los juzgados y de la judicatura, y
variaciones socioculturales en la experiencia y expresión de la emoción.
Palabras clave
Trabajo judicial; emoción; trabajo emocional
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1. Introduction
In Western law traditions, legal rules are understood as impersonal, and judges
embody impartial legal authority. Emotions are viewed as inherently irrational,
disorderly, impulsive and personal, and therefore inconsistent with the rationality
necessary for the legitimate exercise of judicial authority. Whether a judge is
assessing evidence, applying law, making a final decision or an interim order, or
engaging with others in the courtroom, emotions should be set aside. From this
perspective, outward displays of emotion or reliance on emotion in decision-making
both are inconsistent with legal reasoning and the rational application of law. The
“cultural script of judicial dispassion” (Maroney 2011) embedded in this tradition
sharply limits an accepted role for judicial emotion. These limitations may be
expressed in unwritten norms, more formally in judicial ethical codes and guidelines,
in the judicial oath of office, or in legal determinations of the apprehension or
appearance of judicial bias.
The workshop Judging, Emotion and Emotion Work held at IISL from 3-4 May 2018
brought together a remarkable mix of participants: researchers from many
disciplines, nationalities, and career stages, along with judicial officers. The aim of
the workshop was to better understand the nature of emotion, to critically investigate
the claim that emotion is inherently inconsistent with and even detrimental to judicial
work, to explore the role emotions do play in judicial work and to consider whether
and how emotion can play a positive or facilitative role in judicial work.
The participants whose work is contained in this collection include a core of
interdisciplinary scholars working directly on judicial emotion and emotion work,
emotion scholars who have not studied judges, scholars of the judiciary who have
not studied emotion, and judicial officers interested in the role of emotions in their
professional work. Participants came from two globally dominant legal traditions, civil
law and common law, and include contributors from eight different countries:
Australia, England, Germany, Scotland, Sweden, New Zealand, Northern Ireland and
the United States of America. This international diversity enables recognition of
similarities and differences in the structure and organization of courts and the
judiciary and socio-cultural variations in the nature of emotional experience and
expression. Finally, the group is intergenerational, with senior, mid-career and early
career scholars.
A key outcome of this workshop is this special issue of the Oñati Socio-Legal Series.
Fifteen of the papers presented at the workshop have been revised and published
here. The articles in this issue consider emotion in judging from varied theoretical
and empirical perspectives, drawing on insights and methods from disciplines
including law, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, rhetoric, social work,
history and criminology. Some articles aim to identify and understand emotion more
fully, while others more directly investigate the place[s] of emotion in judicial work.
Inquiry is consistently situated in the concrete emotional realities of everyday judicial
work. Several articles challenge the traditional construction of emotion as a detriment
to legitimate judging and propose ways to reposition emotion work as central to
judicial experience and to recognise emotion itself as a positive judicial resource.
Papers are grouped into four major themes: Theoretical, cultural and historical
perspectives; Tensions of the dispassionate ideal; Social dynamics of emotion in
judging; and Research methods, empirical insights and [changing] judicial practice.
It is important to recognise that all the articles draw on or contribute across all the
themes of the workshop and this special issue.
2. Theoretical, cultural, and historical perspectives on emotion and judging
A historical perspective deepens the investigation of judging and emotion in several
ways. The Western, post-Enlightenment image of emotion as the antithesis of
rationality and reason is part of a long-standing cultural tradition, as is the image of
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the judge as dispassionate and without emotion. Nonetheless, different historical
contexts have allowed, recognised or experimented with emotion in judicial work.
Just as ideas of judging change over time and across cultural contexts, so do concepts
and theories of emotion.
In A Role for Emotional Granularity in Judging, Maria Gendron and Lisa Feldman
Barrett demonstrate how research in psychology and neuroscience over the past 30
years has dispelled the oppositional framework between cognition and emotion. This
research concludes that the brain is not organised by traditionally opposed faculties
like reason and emotion; rather, such faculties are intertwined in the brain’s
architecture and functioning. Feelings are core to all conscious experience, though
they are often backgrounded, and certain emotions will be more valuable than others
in legal contexts. Gendron and Feldman Barrett describe the notion of “emotional
granularity”, or the ability to make fine distinctions between different emotions, and
posit that it can enhance decision making. Rather than urging judges to minimise,
ignore or disavow the role of emotion, they propose that improving judges’ emotional
granularity will produce better judicial decision-making.
Drawing on the tools of analytic philosophy, Emily Kidd White in Replaying the Past:
Roles for Emotion in Judicial Invocations of Legislative History, and Precedent argues
that service emotions, or emotions used to facilitate a practice in service of a held
value, are integral to judicial reasoning in the adjudication of constitutional rights.
When in a service role, emotions are implicated in legal reasoning and can play
pragmatic and motivational roles. Judges draw on emotions to put themselves into a
particular emotional frame for the purposes of reasoning well in light of their values.
Their reasoning techniques can entail affectively-laden examples; and judicial
understandings of constitutional rights are regularly sharpened by reference to past
violations. Service emotions tethered to injustice, such as rue and indignation, White
argues, can assist legal reasoning in cases of affronts to human dignity, but are not
a panacea for the limits of formalism.
Some historical epochs or moments have explicitly experimented with combining
emotion and judging. The turn of the 20th century has been of particular interest to
historians due to the forceful transformation of the ideal of judicial emotion that
emerged in several countries during that time. In his article A Revolutionary Feeling
of Justice? Emotion and Legal Judgement in Late Imperial and Early Soviet Russia,
Pavel Vasilyev argues that the free law movement in central Europe played an
important role in raising the significance of judicial emotions and connecting a feeling
of justice to judicial independence and discretion. He examines the implementation
of the concept of “feeling of justice” – an amalgam of conscience and feeling in the
administration of justice – following the 1917 Russian Revolution. This experimental
model of revolutionary justice combined with socialist legal consciousness ultimately
failed, Vasilyev writes, because of institutional inertia, famine and disease, and the
lack of material, financial and human resources, including insufficient numbers of
judges, factors that combined to defeat the emotionally-infused revolutionary ideals
articulated by legal scholars of the era.
By investigating debates in jurisprudence in the German speaking countries during
the early 20th century, Sandra Schnädelbach demonstrates how the changing
socio-political landscape influenced the perception, display and uses of judicial
emotion. Her article The Voice Is the Message: Emotional Practices and Court
Rhetoric in Early Twentieth Century Germany shows that during this era the previous
cultural association between emotional distance and judicial objectivity gave way to
an interactional focus. Judges came to rely on rhetoric and vocal performance as
emotional practices to manage their own emotions and to actively engineer the
emotions of others in court. This approach hinged largely on Rechtsgefühl – a
composite of the German words for law and emotion – and the view that good judges
correctly balance reason and emotion. However, as Schnädelbach tells us, debates
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about the meaning of Rechtsgefühl and the proper role of the judge within it
ultimately thwarted its development.
3. The tensions of the dispassionate ideal
Perhaps no concept is more central to the study of judicial emotion than the ideal of
judicial dispassion. The idea that a good judge should approach her work with no
emotional investment or reaction whatsoever – what Maroney calls the “persistent
cultural script of judicial dispassion” – is a deeply rooted, core feature of most modern
systems of law (Maroney 2011). This entire special issue, and the workshop from
which the papers emerged, exists in disruptive dialectic with that script, and a
number of the authors take it on directly. Two accounts show that judges express
(and, behind such expressions, experience) emotions and suggest that those
emotions are integral to their judging. Another pair of articles explore the collision
between the emotions felt and displayed by laypersons in an ostensibly dispassionate
court, and the manner in which judges can smooth or exacerbate that disjuncture.
In the first category, in Deconstructing Judicial Expressions of Disgust Heather
Conway and John Stannard unearth and analyse evidence of judicial expressions
of disgust, both the ‘core’ disgust characterised by physical repulsion and the “sociomoral” disgust triggered by egregious norm violations. After exploring those two
iterations of disgust and reviewing prior debates over its propriety in law, the authors
describe a sample of written opinions in which they identify verbal disgust signals.
While recognizing the limitations of a case law approach, Stannard and Conway
conclude that the ideal of dispassion does not prevent judges from expressing both
forms of disgust, particularly in criminal cases such as those involving sexual violence
against children.
Cyrus Tata, in Humanising Punishment? Mitigation and “Case-Cleansing” Prior to
Sentencing, calls our attention to a different aspect of the tension over dispassion in
the criminal sentencing context. A judge’s efforts to treat the defendant as a unique
individual with dignity, or what Tata calls humanisation, may be in tension with
efficiency. While humanisation generally is thought to benefit defendants by
enhancing feelings of inclusion and even empowerment, Tata instead focuses on its
impact on legal professionals. By signalling to judges that the system is fair and their
work noble, he argues, humanisation cleanses the proceedings of troubling
ambiguities, providing feelings of comfort and purity (which may or may not be
warranted) and thus promoting efficiency.
Turning to laypersons, in Leaving Emotion Out: Litigants in Person and Emotion in
New Zealand Civil Courts, Bridgette Toy-Cronin draws on her empirical work on
‘litigants in person,’ or self-represented parties, in New Zealand. Legal emotion norms
make courts feel foreign and intimidating, so that these parties may feel out of place
and unable to tell their stories in a legally coherent, relevant manner. While they are
aware of norms dictating that one must “leave emotion out” of court, and while some
may try to comply, their capacity to do so is limited, creating confusion and reducing
litigants’ sense of fairness. Judges, Toy-Cronin observes, display mixed success in
handling these litigants’ emotional norm violations in a respectful manner,
highlighting an area for judicial growth. Self-represented litigants are perceived by
judges as inherently emotional since they are personally involved in the case. Judges
deem these litigants’ emotional expression to be reflections of their character, while
lawyers’ emotional expressions can be interpreted as strategic.
In Family Violence and Judicial Empathy: Managing Personal Cross Examination in
Australian Family Law Proceedings, Tracey Booth examines the extent to which
Australian judges dampen the potential harms of having domestic violence victims
interact with abusers in court, for example, during cross-examination directly by the
self-represented partner. As such encounters may be traumatic and affect the quality
of evidence, judges can modify proceedings – for example, by allowing testimony via
videolink and prohibiting emotionally provocative questioning. However, Booth finds
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that judges’ use of such mechanisms is idiosyncratic. She suggests that these
practices might be more stable were judges consistently to deploy empathy, control
anger, and draw on “background” emotions such as loyalty to justice principles. She
thus draws a direct line between the judge’s emotions and those of the lay
participants.
4. The social dynamics of emotion in judging
When investigating the role of emotion in court, it has been common to focus on
specific actors, such as victims, lawyers, or judges. Lately, however, scholars have
begun to shift attention to the social dynamic of court interactions. Several papers in
this special issue investigate interactions between multiple actors in court,
particularly asking how the judge can influence the emotion experience and
performance of other actors (Toy-Cronin, Booth, Roach Anleu and Mack, Leben).
Three papers use interaction as a theoretical centre and deploy observation research
to tease out what interactions actually “do” in court proceedings.
Stina Bergman Blix and Åsa Wettergren in The Emotional Interaction of Judicial
Objectivity contest the notion of objectivity as a disembodied state, highlight the
interactional aspects of judges’ objectivity work and show how the maintenance of a
dispassionate ideal requires skilled emotional investment. They use two theoretical
constructs to explain the role of emotion in court interaction. First, their attention to
judges’ “background emotions” (Barbalet 2011) broadens the traditional focus on
consciously-accessible emotion states to include habituated, subtle emotions, such
as interest and pride. Second, by incorporating the concept of “the emotive-cognitive
judicial frame” (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018), they urge that the ideal of
dispassionate law be taken into account when investigating judicial emotion,
focussing on how emotion is displayed and reciprocated in a situated frame that
purports to disallow its presence.
By analysing the minute details of facial expressions, gesture and discourse in
Storytelling Rituals in Jury Deliberations, Meredith Rossner uncovers the unfolding
of an “interaction ritual” (Collins 2004) in jury deliberation. The jurors’ initially
individual and competing accounts develop into a joint focus and engagement,
producing shared emotions and solidarity within the group, emotions that are
necessary for arriving at a joint verdict. The ritual elements allow for and work
iteratively with the collective creation of a believable story of “what happened” in the
case. The combination of interaction theory and visual and audio analysis makes it
possible to detect a ritual base of common-sense reasoning in decision-making. While
her direct focus is on jurors, Rossner’s exploration of emotional dynamics in group
decision-making raises intriguing questions about the operation of such dynamics in
multi-member courts, such as the appellate panels common in the United States or
the panels of professional and lay judges that hear trials in Sweden.
Leslie Moran also analyses audio and visual data in The Wit of Judge Rinder: Judges,
Humour and Popular Culture, but his focus on the reality court show Judge Rinder
adds the possibility of investigating the impact of mediating technologies themselves.
How, Moran asks, are audio and visual techniques used in representations of court
proceedings to frame the participants’ interaction and social relations, and in
particular the social dynamics of humour in court? What do judges’ humour and lay
participants’ laughter do? Humour, Moran shows, both amplifies and offers relief from
the social hierarchies of the courtroom. In an interesting finding, he also
demonstrates that camera placement allows the TV audience to both experience the
judge’s point of view and to evaluate the judge’s performance.
5. Research methods, empirical insights and [changing] judicial practice
Increasingly, scholars are moving to integrate theory, especially about the judicial
role and its governing norms, with the direct empirical study of judicial emotion and
emotion work in real-life settings, and to generate research findings that are of
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practical value to the judiciary. Empirical research investigating emotion in any
location presents challenges, as does investigating judging. Studying the combination
– emotional aspects of judging – presents particular difficulties, as it requires
interrogating the experiences and behaviour of a sometimes difficult population for
researchers to access, while inquiring about emotion, something regarded as having
little or no legitimate role in judicial practice. The articles in this section provide
examples of conceptually original, empirically valid and practically valuable research.
Collectively, they confirm that emotion may be perceived by the judiciary as an
impediment to fair and neutral performance of their role, but they also identify many
ways that judges themselves understand that emotion, properly managed and
displayed, can and should become a resource for good judging.
In Empirically Investigating Judicial Emotion, Terry Maroney systematically
addresses the current state of empirical research into judging and emotion and
suggests directions and methods for future research. After carefully defining both
judicial emotion and empirical research, she generates a taxonomy of different
research approaches to guide the field’s disciplined development. Next, she
undertakes a detailed review of extant research projects investigating judging and
emotion, focusing – first – on how their approaches fit within the taxonomy, and –
second – on what methods they deploy, considering the challenges, advantages, and
disadvantages of each. While much important work has been done, Maroney
characterizes the field of empirical study of judicial emotion as containing “wide-open
spaces” for more exploration.
In A Sociological Perspective on Emotion Work and Judging Sharyn Roach Anleu
and Kathy Mack undertake a detailed sociological analysis of a single extract from
an interview with an Australian judicial officer, drawn from a larger multi-year project
(Roach Anleu and Mack 2017), as a vehicle to articulate the many ways that emotion
and emotion work are part of judicial work. Emotion requires management, even
suppression, and is also used consciously or proactively as a resource to achieve
normative and practical goals. The concept of and commitment to impartiality
provides an anchor and a tool for emotion management, shaping, but not entirely
determining, the boundaries of judging, emotion and emotion work. They conclude
by suggesting emotion work as central to judicial performance.
In Exploring the Overlap between Procedural-Justice Principles and Emotion
Regulation in the Courtroom, Steve Leben provides a vivid example of the value of
academic research for judicial practice. He explores and connects two significant
theoretical and empirical literatures: procedural-justice principles and emotion
regulation. He identifies areas of overlap between these concepts and argues that
procedural justice principles, commonly embraced by judges in the USA, also
promote and depend on judicial emotion regulation. The perceived fairness of the
court process may require avoiding certain judicial emotions and their display, such
as anger, but perceptions of fairness also allow or demand some emotions – for
example, empathy – and associated displays when they demonstrate a judge’s
sincerity. Both conceptual perspectives, Leben argues, support the conclusion that
judges should pay more attention to their own emotions.
In Judicial Perspectives on Emotion, Emotion Management, and Judicial Excellence in
the USA, Jennifer Elek introduces the intensive empirical research and practical
directions generated by the US National Center for State Courts Judicial Excellence
Project. The Project undertook interviews, focus groups and surveys to identify what
judicial excellence means to judges. Findings reveal that judicial excellence
incorporates a wide range of judicial capacities and behaviours, including
considerable attention to their own emotions and those of others; that excellence
requires skill in emotion management, of self and others; and that emotion can be a
tool for effective judicial work. These insights have been incorporated into a
framework to inform and support judicial professional development.
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6. Concluding remarks
The workshop itself and the articles produced from it have generated a broad sociolegal examination of emotion[s] and emotion work in judging from diverse
disciplinary, conceptual, empirical and jurisdictional perspectives. These articles bring
together examinations of the nature of emotion itself; subjective judicial emotional
experience, self-perception and management; judicial emotion work in courtroom
interaction; emotion in judicial decision-making, including interpreting the emotion
of others; and cultural variation in emotion scripts, together generating possible ways
of repositioning emotion as a positive judicial resource.
This workshop was positioned against a backdrop in which even those scholars who
perceive the importance of understanding or reconstructing judging in order to more
accurately account for emotion might be inclined to assume that emotion remains in
tension with conventional claims to judicial impartiality and legitimacy. One insight
from this workshop is the importance of identifying the extent to which this legal
suspicion of emotion in judging reflects ignorance about the nature of emotion. That
suspicion takes emotion to be largely reactive, spontaneous, and physical, and it
imports that assumption into its baseline assessment of how emotion is experienced
and expressed by judges and others in the courtroom. A more up to date and nuanced
conception of emotion, in contrast, entails complicating our understanding of the core
qualities of judging, such as impartiality, objectivity, and fairness, in relation to
emotion, its management and display.
In looking to promote future research in this field, the meeting crossed disciplinary
boundaries, modeling the inherent interdisciplinarity of research on emotion and
judging and championing the value (and challenge) of interdisciplinary dialogue.
Another challenge we collectively identified is the practical difficulty of detecting,
gathering data on, and coding emotions. This difficulty is magnified by disciplinary
differences in how to define and identify emotions, as well as by the methodological
challenges of investigating often backgrounded emotions with low or ambiguous
physical visibility. Both these points highlight the importance of thinking carefully
about the questions we are asking and the methods best suited to answering them,
and of situating the analysis of emotion and judging within a cultural and structural
context.
Lastly, the mix of scholars and judges at the workshop and as authors in in this
special issue raised the importance of communication between researchers and
practitioners. Such dialogue enables us to learn from one another, to “give back to
the field” by presenting and writing publications for judicial audiences, and to use the
growing interest from judges to enable future research to incorporate evolving
judicial practice.
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